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SUMMARY
This is the eighth report of the European Economic
Advisory Group. Like the previous ones, it starts with
an assessment of the macroeconomic outlook. In pre-
ceding reports this first chapter was usually followed
by topical chapters that dealt with medium and long
run issues relevant to the European economy as a
whole. This year, the report is structured differently. A
sense of mayhem struck the world economy in
autumn 2008 as the financial crisis suddenly gathered
momentum and started spreading to the real econo-
my, which slid into recession. Chapter 2 provides a
detailed account of the crisis and the various stages of
its development, and highlights key policy recommen-
dations regarding regulation of financial institutions
and international financial architecture. We argue that
regulations such as minimal equity requirements
should be extended to all bank-like institutions rather
than be confined to the commercial banking sector,
that a more sophisticated definition of value-at-risk
should be introduced to take into account the possi-
bility of high liquidity premia and of asset bubbles,
and that there is a need for a common system of
financial regulation and supervision at the European
level.
The crisis has fuelled an ongoing debate about the
virtues of financial capitalism and none of its compo-
nents have been spared. In particular, among the
many innovations that have appeared in the last two
decades are private equity firms that are under close
scrutiny and criticism in some circles. Chapter 3
analyses how these firms work and how they con-
tribute to the allocation of resources. Overall, we are
sceptical of the critiques and think there is no sys-
temic risk associated with these firms. (Their liabilities
have little leverage and while they do leverage their
investments, this is associated with little covenants
and hence low risks of bankruptcy.)
From now on, each edition of the EEAG report will
include one chapter that focuses on one EU member
country. This year that chapter is devoted to France,
which elected a new president in 2007 with promises
of bold economic reform. We provide a mixed assess-
ment of those reforms; having a large number of
reforms does not necessarily mean large economic
effects if those reforms run in different directions and
may well be reversed in the future. We find more
promise in the broad reform of the government than
in the areas of taxation, the welfare state or product
and labour market regulation, where there appear to
be many inconsistencies.
Chapter 1: Macroeconomic outlook and policy
The worldwide financial crisis reached a critical stage
in autumn 2008. While for a long time the problems
were limited to providing liquidity to the banking sec-
tor, the situation escalated when some of the big
financial institutions turned insolvent. To prevent a
breakdown of the global financial system, govern-
ments had to intervene on a large scale in nearly all
industrial countries. This was nevertheless not able to
avert a worldwide drop in economic sentiment and
subsequently large parts of the world economy fell
into recession last year. After four years of rapid
expansion, average world GDP growth only reached
3.4 percent in 2008 when using PPP weights or
2.3 percent when using market rates. For this year we
only expect a world GDP growth rate of 1.4 and
0.3 percent, respectively.
During the first half of last year, the US economy still
experienced positive growth. Although employment
already started to fall in January, production
increased and most of the available business cycle
indicators pointed towards a continuation of moder-
ate growth. From a demand-side perspective, a fiscal
stimulus plan initiated in early 2008 was able to keep
private consumption growth positive during the first
half of the year. The situation changed dramatically,
however, at the end of the summer. Industrial produc-
tion and capacity utilisation plummeted in August.
Furthermore, in September the US government decid-
ed against a bail out of the investment bank Lehman
Brothers, triggering a severe drop in sentiment indica-
tors and investment activities. From June onwards,
personal consumption expenditures declined as well.Consequently, in last year’s third quarter, GDP
growth turned negative in the US. 
The fiscal budget deficit in the fiscal year 2008
increased to 3.3 percent of GDP. The increase in
expenditures by 9 percent was the highest increase
since 1990. For fiscal 2009 and as a reaction to the
persistent crisis in the banking and financial systems,
the US government decided to implement a sizeable
rescue package. Furthermore, the Federal Reserve cut
their target rate from 5.25 percent in September 2007
to only 0.25 percent at the end of last year. 
Despite expansive fiscal and accommodative mone-
tary policy, the recession in the United States will
continue throughout the year. GDP will decline by
1.0 percent this year. Only at the end of 2010 is a
slow recovery expected. This downturn will be so
persistent mainly because US consumers have been
living beyond their means for too long. To allow for
a way back to a sustainable growth path, this behav-
iour must now be corrected. Only net exports will be
able to contribute positively to economic growth in
the US. 
In general Asian markets have so far been able to play
a stabilising role in the current crisis. Although their
savings enabled the huge US current account deficit
and consequently the US consumer boom in the first
place, the reserves they have built up this way are now
helping to stabilise the global economy. Since 2005 the
growth differential between Asia and the US has
increased. Still, economic growth in Asia remains
dependent upon developments in the US, and the
trade surpluses and the growth contributions of net
exports decreased substantially. 
As all of the major developed economies are in reces-
sion, export- and investment-driven expansion in
many Asian countries will be affected more strongly
in 2009 and 2010. Although domestic demand will be
able to continue to grow in most economies for some
time and the global financial crisis has already trig-
gered a complete reversal of monetary policy in the
region, growth will further slow down.
The European economy
After a still relatively positive outlook at the begin-
ning of last year, the economic climate deteriorated
markedly as the year progressed. The turbulences on
international financial markets as well as the col-
lapse in sentiment seen within the industrial sector
and amongst consumers throughout Europe in the
second half of the year have increasingly been re-
flected by data on real economic output. Accord-
ingly, most European countries are or will soon be in
recession. This means that, unlike in the past,
national demand shortfalls will not be offset by
growth in other countries and growth in final domes-
tic demand in the European Union will reach an all-
time low. Against this backdrop, GDP will decline by
1.2 percent this year. 
Overall, the consolidation of public finances stopped
and both actual and cyclically-adjusted fiscal balances
deteriorated; fiscal consolidation no longer is on the
top of the agenda. Especially since the autumn, mem-
ber states continue to announce rescue packages, first
of all for the banking sector, and more recently for the
other parts of the economy.
After an additional tightening at the beginning of last
year due to a further appreciation of the euro, the
monetary conditions in the euro area stayed at
restricted levels until summer last year. Since then, the
ECB has gradually been lowering interest rates, but
the still strong euro prevents monetary conditions
from being called loose at present. 
Especially in those countries facing a sharp downturn
in the property market, in particular Ireland, Spain
and the United Kingdom, there were large falls in res-
idential investment spending throughout the year.
Overall, low investment will put a burden on growth
in Europe this year. A combination of falling profits,
tougher financing conditions and lower growth
prospects has sharply reduced the willingness of firms
to invest. 
Whereas private consumption was still an important
pillar for economic growth in Europe in 2007, it basi-
cally stagnated in 2008. Increased inflation rates dur-
ing the first quarters and slowly deteriorating labour
market conditions together with sharply deteriorating
financial prospects thereafter have all had a negative
impact on consumer behaviour. However, rapidly
falling inflation rates at the end of last year allowed
consumption to slowly pick up again. Of the demand
components only private and public consumption will
be able to positively contribute to economic growth
this year. Those countries suffering a real estate crisis
will face substantially lower consumption growth. 
Despite the strength of the euro, net exports con-
tributed positively to GDP growth in the European
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Union last year. The slowdown in export growth was
met by a comparable fall in import growth rates. Only
at the end of the year did the trade surplus start to fall
as imports picked up. Much weaker demand from the
rest of the world will lead to a further slowdown of
export growth. 
The unemployment rate has been increasing since the
first quarter of last year. Weak business cycle devel-
opments will lead to an increase in the unemployment
rate to an average of 8.1 percent in the European
Union this year, and it will continue to rise through-
out the rest of our forecasting horizon. 
Chapter 2: The financial crisis
Chapter 2 reconsiders the micro and macroeconomic
roots of the financial crisis.
The process of securitisation
The chapter starts from the analysis of the process of
securitisation of subprime mortgages in US mortgage
market, where all the evil originated. Through this
process, cash flows from heterogeneous mortgage
contracts between borrowers and banks were trans-
formed into homogenous asset backed securities
(ABSs), with distinct ratings, traded in global mar-
kets. Per se, securitisation is a good idea: by favouring
diversification of mortgage risk, it can allow interme-
diaries to increase lending, to the benefits of house-
holds and firms. However, because of a combination
of macroeconomic factors, bad/insufficient regulation
and agency problems, in the last few years this process
was fundamentally flawed. First, massive undervalua-
tion of fundamental risk and market liquidity risk
caused both the origination of subprime mortgages,
and the issuance of ABSs with AAA ratings derived
from the underlying pool of mortgages to be excessive
by any reasonable standards. Second, several layers of
securitisation, each involving some form of credit
enhancement and insurance, translated into high
opacity of ABSs, which hampered the ability of an
intermediary to assess the amount and the location of
risk in its portfolio. Finally, risk diversification was
only apparent, in the sense that the high-rating ABSs
sold to end-investors (pension funds, mutual funds,
etc) were guaranteed by intermediaries – when the cri-
sis erupted, in large part ABSs were absorbed back by
highly leveraged financial institutions. With a high
level of opacity, diversification of ABSs among inter-
mediaries actually created systemic risk by generating
dangerous network externalities, which eventually
undermined market liquidity for many classes of
assets and financial markets. 
Two phases of the crisis: from soft- to hard-landing
The chapter analyses two distinct phases of the crisis.
During the first phase, from 2007 to the summer of
2008, policy-makers believed in a smooth exit from
the crisis (the “soft-landing”scenario). The prevailing
view was that the fundamental problems at the root of
the admittedly dangerous pathology in money mar-
kets were relatively manageable, in the sense that they
could be absorbed over time by adopting a two-armed
policy approach. On the one hand, central banks
would make up for the lack of liquidity in the inter-
bank markets by providing financial intermediaries
with enough cash to operate without relying on each
other for credit. Liquidity provision would then buy
time for banks to restructure, namely, to raise new
equity capital, and write-down bad debt – while con-
taining the need for sharp de-leveraging, with the
associated negative effects on real activity. On the
other hand, treasuries and central banks would inter-
vene on a case-by-case basis to support banks under
threat of failure – either as a result of a run or because
of fundamental losses (the main principle driving
interventions being the need to preserve the function-
ing of large intermediaries with many market inter-
connections, whose failure would have strong sys-
temic effects). 
The second phase (hard-landing) erupted when co-
ordination of expectations on the soft landing
hypothesis ended in July-August 2008. The assess-
ment and perception of the magnitude of the finan-
cial crisis rose with new figures on mortgage delin-
quency rates and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation took over the California-based Indymac
Bank, then hit by a run on deposits. In response to
spreading financial turmoil, the Treasury stepped up
its commitment to support Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac in July, making the government guarantee explic-
it at first, before placing them under federal conserva-
torship at the beginning of September. Most crucial-
ly, the view that the real economic sector would be
spared no longer held up against the evidence.
The difficulties of the government to present a coher-
ent and possibly co-ordinated plan to address the cri-
sis almost cause a run on deposit in mid-October,
when nervous investors started to withdraw cash from
banks (many newspaper reported an unusual rise inthe demand for home safes), and many switched
banks in pursuit of intermediaries backed by the
strongest government guarantees. 
An important element in our interpretation of the
soft landing phase is the fact that, initially, the effect
of the crisis on deleveraging was quite contained. In
the hard-landing scenario after autumn 2008, it is
quite likely that the world will experience a deleverag-
ing cycle, possibly with an impact on the level of activ-
ity by firms and the spending plans of households.
Since September 2008, global rebalancing has been
proceeding in the form of substantial write-downs by
financial intermediaries. Against estimates of total
losses by financial intermediaries ranging from
$1.4 trillion (IMF 2008) and $3 trillion, at the end of
2008 total reported write-downs amounted already to
around $1 trillion.
Lessons from the crisis and proposals for reform
In the wake of the crisis, proposals of reforms
abound. In this report, we focus on deriving a small
set of lessons from the crisis towards the definition of
broad-based principles to follow in correcting the
flaws in the system. The merits of different proposals
do not necessarily lie on their being radical but on
their consistency with the ultimate goals of public
governance of financial system.
Some of these lessons are shared by many other insti-
tutions and scholars. Intermediaries that, like banks,
engage in maturity transformation and are exposed to
liquidity runs should be subject to the same principles
of regulation and supervision as banks. Regulation
and supervision is motivated by the implicit govern-
ment commitment to bail out the intermediaries when
their default has systemic effects and negative exter-
nalities on the payment system. Bankruptcy of com-
mercial banks threatens the payment system directly,
via its implications for depositors. For other interme-
diaries, one argument is that such threat is rooted in
the network externality, via the systemic implications
of their bankruptcy for market liquidity and the bal-
ance sheets of other intermediaries. Indeed, with the
subprime crisis, trust among banks evaporated: the
interbank market virtually collapsed. A different view
is that the activities of these intermediaries grew into
a threat to financial stability because bailout guaran-
tees according to the too-big-to-fail doctrine provide
an incentive for them to grow excessively, take on
excessive risk, and become too leveraged. Unless these
guarantees can be eliminated completely – which is
not credible in light of past and recent experiences – it
is rational to associate the provision of contingent
public resources to regulation and supervision.
Thus, investment banks, as well as any other institu-
tion that performs bank functions must be subjected
to the same rules that apply to commercial banks. The
regulatory constraints should be dependent on the
type of business rather than the legal status of the
bank that pursues this business. This applies in partic-
ular to capital requirements. 
First of all, broad international agreements must be
finally reached on the harmonisation of banking
supervision. These agreements can be based on a
reformed Basel-II system, which encompasses all
institutions performing banking functions and takes
into account systemic and cyclical factors. Minimum
equity requirements in Basel II should be reconsid-
ered, so as to increase the incentive for shareholders to
pursue more prudent business models and choose
more conservative incentive schemes for bank man-
agers. In any case, failures of corporate governance
controls and pitfalls in executive compensation
should be addressed. 
The apparent failure of the current system to elicit the
use of proper models of risk assessment by interme-
diaries and guarantee transparency is perhaps the
main sticky point for rebuilding trust in the financial
system. Simply increasing a coefficient of equity
requirement will not do. What matters is instead a
standard of asset valuation that (eventually) address-
es the main problems in prudential regulation: the
possibility of mispricing due to bubbles and market
illiquidity, generating non-fundamental volatility of
asset prices; procyclicality of lending; and transparen-
cy and information to investors.
Second, whenever possible, derivative products, such
as CDS, should be traded in transparent, organised
markets and not in opaque OTC markets. A common
argument is that, while centralised trade may be feasi-
ble for some derivative products, many others are spe-
cialised and designed specifically for an investor/com-
pany, so that no organised market would be econom-
ical. However, following the recent problems of mark-
ing to market when no market exists, those buying
such products probably now realise a major benefit
from having centralised, transparent and liquid mar-
kets for derivatives. The specific needs of customers,
in many cases, can probably be addressed by forming
appropriate portfolios of existing contracts traded on
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liquid markets. By the same token, short sales should
not be prohibited; instead vigilance of potential mar-
ket manipulation should be enhanced.
Fourth, Europe needs a common system of financial
regulation and supervision. The European System of
Central Banks should assume an explicit role of guar-
antor of the system, acquire supervisory powers over
European groups, and coordinate with national cen-
tral banks the national financial intermediaries. We
propose a two-tier system. For pan-European finan-
cial groups, supervision should be allocated to the
European Central Bank. These groups should then be
required to subscribe to a European Deposit Insur-
ance Fund, to complement national deposit insurance
schemes. Otherwise countries should individually
have the responsibility for bearing losses created by
their own intermediaries.
Fifth, the specificity of the banking sector in compe-
tition policy should be recognised explicitly and for-
mally. This would ensure coherence between competi-
tion policy and financial stability policy, and help
stem the political pressure to extend financial bailouts
to other sectors of the economy.
Furthermore, it is highly advisable to reconsider lim-
ited personal liability limitations for mortgages and
other real-estate loans where they exist (such as in the
United States). The promotion of home ownership
should be examined carefully from a financial point of
view, given the potential systemic implications of
incentives raising the risk profile of borrowers against
public guarantees.
Chapter 3: Private equity
Private equity plays an important role in the financial
system. The few years before the credit crunch were
probably the most favourable that had ever existed for
private equity – with abundant capital, low interest
rates, increasing stock market values, and a truly
amazing willingness amongst banks and other
investors to provide debt financing on a scale and on
terms never previously observed. This led to a huge
expansion in the amount of capital allocated to pri-
vate equity funds, and an associated broadening of
their sights: private equity funds acquired some multi-
billion euro companies, and concluded deals in virtu-
ally all sectors of the economy. Consequently, private
equity funds currently control a significant fraction of
the businesses in many European countries. 
With this increased scale of activity has, inevitably,
come increased public interest, particularly regarding
one type of private equity: leveraged buyouts.
Concerns have been expressed regarding the extent
and sources of value creation, transparency, and tax-
ation issues. However, much of the debate in the
media and amongst politicians has been characterized
by misunderstandings about the workings of private
equity. This is not entirely surprising given the secre-
tive nature of many private equity funds. The first
contribution of this chapter is to provide a brief
primer on private equity, which documents its growth
within Europe and shines some light into the work-
ings of the sector.
Does private equity create value?
The economic impact of private equity can be mea-
sured in various ways. Financial returns are clearly the
key objective for the funds and their investors. Here
the evidence within Europe is mixed: early stage ven-
ture capital has produced very poor returns on aver-
age, whereas the returns on leveraged buyouts, in
recent years, appear to be impressive. However, it is
difficult to benchmark these returns – for instance
against those earned by publicly quoted companies –
without adjusting for risk. And adjusting for risk –
particularly financial risk – is critical, since the invest-
ments are highly leveraged. Indeed, in the period
before the credit markets closed in summer 2007, pri-
vate equity funds used record amounts of leverage,
and therefore increased the risk of their portfolio
companies. But little research has been produced to
analyse risk-adjusted returns, given the need for infor-
mation on the capital structure of the portfolio com-
panies, which is difficult to obtain. But in the same
way that leverage amplified the returns earned by pri-
vate equity funds when the economy was growing, the
impact of this leverage on risk will undoubtedly result
in some large losses during the recession, and some
significant negative returns for some funds. However,
there may be fewer bankruptcies than might be ex-
pected due to the loose covenants attached to much of
the lending. On the other hand, private equity funds
are likely to have to retain their investments in their
portfolio companies for longer.
The impact of private equity ownership on employment
Politicians and the media are often more intrigued by
the impact of private equity on employment rather
than value creation. The evidence here is much more
difficult to interpret, as there is always the counter-factual issue: what would employment have been in
the absence of private equity? This is particularly
problematic given that many targets for private equity
are in need of major restructuring. In general, the evi-
dence on the impact on employment is complex to
interpret. If anything, the evidence seems to suggest
that employment grows at somewhat lower rates than
in comparable publicly traded companies. Whether
this is a good or bad thing is another matter. But the
claims of some unions and politicians that private
equity funds always sack workers are based more on
anecdote than systematic evidence. 
The transparency debate
A major issue facing private equity funds is that there
is little understanding of how they add value or their
impact on the companies in which they invest. This is
in part due to the culture of privacy within the indus-
try, which is a major impediment to public under-
standing of the role of private equity in the economy.
Whilst some analysis has been published, it is often
selective and partial, and frequently funded and vet-
ted by industry associations. For many of the success-
ful funds there is good story to tell, but to date only
the large institutional investors have heard it. As a
result, the claims of private equity funds are often
greeted with scepticism. 
One outcome of the veil of secrecy has been the push
to increase transparency in many countries. Whilst
no bad thing, this is likely to have limited impact.
The investors in private equity funds already had
access to regular, detailed reporting. There is no
information asymmetry for those providing the cap-
ital, and, if there was, then as some of the largest
and most sophisticated global investors they could
obtain any information they desired. It is not clear
that private companies should have to comply with
different standards of reporting according to who
the owners are. In general, the Walker review, and
similar initiatives in other countries, may have some
effect at the margin in terms of information flow to
employees and other interested parties, but is unlike-
ly to satisfy the critics.
Tax policies towards private equity
Another issue that has excited interest in the private
equity funds has been taxation. At the corporate
level, tax policies to make leveraged buyouts more
difficult or costly have questionable justification and
uncertain impact. The optimal capital structure will
differ between companies, and restricting the tax-
deductibility of debt will either raise the post-tax
cost of capital or encourage tax avoidance by com-
panies that find themselves constrained by the poli-
cy. In many cases the main impact of such policies is
likely to be felt by the existing owners of companies
that might be acquired by private equity funds,
rather than in the returns earned by private equity
funds themselves. At the personal level the taxation
of private equity executives is an area that warrants
careful consideration, as it is debatable whether their
profit shares should be taxed as capital gains as
opposed to income, or some hybrid of the two. But
given the international nature of the industry, it is
questionable how much money would be raised –
especially in the next few years when profit shares
may become a distant memory – and poorly
thought-out policy might result in significant
changes in the location of the funds. 
The likely impact of the financial crisis on private 
equity
Finally, although the future returns earned by private
equity funds that invested heavily in the period prior
to the leverage bubble bursting in August 2007 are
likely to be poor, the extent of financial distress and
bankruptcy of the portfolio companies may be lower
than might be expected. In large part this is due to
the fact that private equity funds took full advantage
of the unprecedentedly generous terms associated
with debt financing during the leverage bubble.
Whilst the investment banks, hedge funds and CLO
(collateralised loan obligations) funds that provided
the debt have witnessed spectacular losses, many of
the portfolio companies themselves now enjoy long-
term fixed rate, cheap debt financing with few
covenants. Of course, leverage increases the suscepti-
bility to financial distress and bankruptcy, and there
is no doubt that some high-profile bankruptcies will
occur. But the financial structure employed by many
private equity funds may enable many of their port-
folio companies to continue operating without
defaulting long enough to see through the recession.
What is in no doubt, is that holding periods will
lengthen, investment rates will slow, the terms of
future lending will return to historical norms, and
that most existing funds will witness significantly
reduced returns.
However, history informs us that some of the best
periods to invest in private equity are at the start of a
recession, when asset prices are low and the need for
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rapid corporate transformations is at a premium.
Private equity fundraising continues, constrained
mainly by over-allocation of some institutional
investors who have committed future funds assuming
that realizations would continue at similar rates as in
recent years. The private equity model provides an
alternative form of governance, with ownership no
longer separated from control. At its best, this can
result in a rapid transformation of companies and the
creation of significant value. Economies need a diver-
sity of sources of capital, and public policy should let
the market decide which source is most appropriate
for a given company, without imposing tax or other
regulatory restrictions to favour one source over
another.
Chapter 4: France
In 2007 a new president, Nicolas Sarkozy, was elect-
ed in France after having promised radical change in
many areas, including that of economic policy. In this
EEAG report we take stock of his first year and half
in office, and try to assess the country’s economic
performance as well as the reforms that have been
undertaken.
At face value the results look positive overall, at least
if one ignores the financial crisis. Unemployment had
been falling until the summer of 2008, and a vast
reform programme has been launched. 
Closer inspection, though, suggests that one should
be more cautious. The fall in unemployment is largely
a cyclical factor, shared with many other European
countries. The unemployment rate remains above the
eurozone average and closely follows its movements.
The room of manoeuvre for fiscal policy is small,
because structural deficits have been the norm for the
past two decades. As a result public debt tends to rise
very quickly in slumps and is only stabilized in
upturns, thus the margin of stabilisation is small and
shrinks after each downturn. The current one is no
exception and we expect France to emerge from it
with a worrying fiscal position. Also, the growth per-
formance remains modest. Finally, France has one of
the largest government sector and the welfare state
and the government is faced with the dilemma
between fulfilling its commitment at an increasing tax
cost or downsizing at considerable political costs.
As for the numerous reforms that have been under-
taken, we have some concerns about the lack of quan-
titative significance of many of them as well as the
existence of contradictions and the absence of a clear
direction. 
Traditionally, French reforms have suffered from
three flaws. First, they typically are incremental.
Rather than aiming at a deep change of the existing
system, most often reform intervenes at its margin,
often by adding new limited schemes. The Sarkozy
measures are no exception. Second, the regulatory
environment is complex. The more complex the sys-
tem, the more difficult it is to operate. This means that
policies do not have their intended effect, either
because their interaction with the pre-existing system
is neglected, or because lower levels of authority have
considerable discretion in applying the law, as it is
practically impossible to apply it entirely. Instead of
tackling that complexity, the current reforms mostly
increase it through incremental add-ons. Third,
reforms have often been reversed. If reforms are high-
ly reversible, economic agents will ignore them when
setting their strategy but be happy to cash-in whatev-
er benefits are available. The end result is that policy
is ineffective. 
The lack of a clear direction is due to the diversity of
inspirations underlying the reforms. This reflects var-
ious strands of the public debate and ideological
stances; we identify four competing paradigms.
Some reforms are motivated by the will to liberalise
markets and foster competition, which is traditionally
part of the Right’s ideological stance. Some are moti-
vated by economic nationalism (“France Inc.”), i.e.,
the desire to boost employment and activity for
French businesses with little regard for whether the
policies are efficient or pro-competitive. Some are
motivated by a corporatist paradigm that tends to
ascribe a high institutional weight to so-called “social
partners” (employees and employer’s representative),
ignoring the anti-outsider bias which is inherent in
such a process, as well as the fact that it can deliver
modest reforms at best. Finally some policies are
motivated by the view that there should constantly be
“social progress”, implying that any redistributive
measure is irreversible. This explains the secular rise in
government size, or in the number of workers paid the
minimum wage, which now stands at a staggering
16 percent of total employment.
These competing motivations explain why some of
the Sarkozy reforms offset each other. For example,
reductions in taxes granted by the first wave ofreforms were then nullified by new taxes that were
meant to finance some new social expenditures. 
So do we conclude that the government’s policy is
essentially hot air and that we expect France to
remain a land of low growth, few jobs and little eco-
nomic opportunity? Not quite, for we find two rea-
sons for more optimism. First, while reforms are
small, equally small ones have failed in the past
because of organised protests. The catch-all reform
strategy of the Sarkozy administration has made it
more difficult to coordinate such protests. As a result
many reforms have succeeded that were initially
thought to be candidates for failure, and reforms in
general have gained legitimacy. Second, a quiet revo-
lution (called the general revision of public policy,
RGPP) is underway in the public sector in the form of
a plan to merge and rationalise public services and
increase the scope for economic incentives, competi-
tion and autonomy. While it is the textbook case of a
project where “the devil is in the details”, if conduct-
ed properly this reform will eventually reduce the size
of the public sector to the level of a normal OECD
country rather than that of a Scandinavian country.
This will make possible a reduction in taxes by say
3 to 6 percentage points of GDP, which in turn will
ignite a virtuous circle between greater private
employment and lower social expenses. Furthermore,
by reducing the number of attractive top-level posi-
tions in the public sector, the reform may also cure a
long debated French “disease”, which is that the most
talented individuals work for the bureaucracy rather
than more innovative sectors; this is likely to be re-
versed when the public sector becomes less attractive,
and it is expected that it will have positive effects on
innovation and growth. 
Our main recommendation is that the administration
should use its freshly acquired political capital to
focus on a few key reforms. One of them is underway,
the RGPP, and we think it could go faster and be
given more care if one dispensed with a host of other
marginal reforms. Another, which is far more taboo,
would be a reduction of the minimum wage. We argue
that an important opportunity has been lost with the
introduction of an earned income tax credit (RSA), a
supplementary welfare scheme that eliminates a
poverty trap for welfare recipients. While RSA
increases the supply of labour for low-skilled workers,
it does nothing on the demand side. Many of the cor-
responding jobs are not going to be created because it
is not profitable for firms to do so. Instead, RSA
should have been packaged with a reduction in the
minimum wage. This would have set the stage for the
progressive replacement of that distortionary scheme
by a far less distortionary earned income tax credit
system; it would have reduced the excessive propor-
tion of workers at the minimum wage; and it would
have stimulated labour demand as a counterpart to
the labour supply stimulus of the RSA.
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